navidrome/plugins/sandbox_fs_test.go

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fix(plugins): confine plugin filesystem mounts to their root (#5881) * fix(plugins): confine plugin filesystem mounts to their root A plugin granted read-write filesystem access could escape its mount by creating a relative symlink inside it and then writing through that link, reaching any path the server process can write, including navidrome.db. wazero resolves guest paths by concatenating them onto the host root. Its WASI layer validates every path argument except the symlink target, which path_symlink forwards unvalidated by design, and fs.ValidPath splits on "/" only, so on Windows a "..\" path escapes the mount as well. Mounts now go through a jailedFS wrapper that denies symlink creation and rejects any path that is not filepath.IsLocal. That requires bypassing extism's AllowedPaths, which discards any FSConfig passed alongside it, so the mounts are built directly and applied per instance instead. Following symlinks that already exist in a mount is unchanged: music libraries rely on it, and read-only mounts already reject creating new ones. * test(plugins): guard against setting extism AllowedPaths Extracts the extism manifest construction so a test can assert AllowedPaths is never set. Setting it makes extism build its own FSConfig and discard the jailed mounts, silently restoring the symlink escape. Verified by simulating the regression: with AllowedPaths populated for plugins holding the filesystem permission, the new spec fails, as do two of the end-to-end sandbox specs.
2026-08-02 12:27:08 -04:00
package plugins
import (
"context"
"encoding/json"
"net/http"
"os"
"path/filepath"
"github.com/navidrome/navidrome/conf"
"github.com/navidrome/navidrome/conf/configtest"
"github.com/navidrome/navidrome/model"
"github.com/navidrome/navidrome/tests"
. "github.com/onsi/ginkgo/v2"
. "github.com/onsi/gomega"
)
type sandboxInput struct {
Operation string `json:"operation"`
MountPoint string `json:"mount_point,omitempty"`
FilePath string `json:"file_path,omitempty"`
Content string `json:"content,omitempty"`
Target string `json:"target,omitempty"`
}
type sandboxOutput struct {
FileContent string `json:"file_content,omitempty"`
Error *string `json:"error,omitempty"`
}
// startSandboxManager loads test-library against libraryDir with the given grant.
func startSandboxManager(tmpDir, libraryDir string, grant func(*model.Plugin)) *Manager {
GinkgoHelper()
installed := installTestPlugins(tmpDir, "test-library"+PackageExtension)
grant(&installed[0])
DeferCleanup(configtest.SetupConfig())
conf.Server.Plugins.Enabled = true
conf.Server.Plugins.Folder = conf.NewDir(tmpDir)
conf.Server.Plugins.AutoReload = false
mockPluginRepo := tests.CreateMockPluginRepo()
mockPluginRepo.Permitted = true
mockPluginRepo.SetData(installed)
mockLibraryRepo := &tests.MockLibraryRepo{}
mockLibraryRepo.SetData(model.Libraries{{ID: 1, Name: "Test Library", Path: libraryDir}})
manager := &Manager{
plugins: make(map[string]*plugin),
ds: &tests.MockDataStore{MockedPlugin: mockPluginRepo, MockedLibrary: mockLibraryRepo},
subsonicRouter: http.NotFoundHandler(),
}
Expect(manager.Start(GinkgoT().Context())).To(Succeed())
DeferCleanup(func() { _ = manager.Stop() })
return manager
}
// callSandbox runs one filesystem operation inside the plugin sandbox.
func callSandbox(manager *Manager, input sandboxInput) sandboxOutput {
GinkgoHelper()
manager.mu.RLock()
p := manager.plugins["test-library"]
manager.mu.RUnlock()
Expect(p).ToNot(BeNil())
instance, err := p.instance(context.Background())
Expect(err).ToNot(HaveOccurred())
defer instance.Close(context.Background())
inputBytes, err := json.Marshal(input)
Expect(err).ToNot(HaveOccurred())
_, outputBytes, err := instance.Call("nd_test_library", inputBytes)
Expect(err).ToNot(HaveOccurred())
var output sandboxOutput
Expect(json.Unmarshal(outputBytes, &output)).To(Succeed())
return output
}
var _ = Describe("Plugin filesystem sandbox", Ordered, ContinueOnFailure, func() {
var (
manager *Manager
libraryDir string
outsideDir string
secretFile string
mountPoint string
)
call := func(input sandboxInput) sandboxOutput {
GinkgoHelper()
input.MountPoint = mountPoint
return callSandbox(manager, input)
}
BeforeAll(func() {
tmpDir := GinkgoT().TempDir()
libraryDir = filepath.Join(tmpDir, "music-library")
Expect(os.MkdirAll(libraryDir, 0755)).To(Succeed())
// Sibling of the mount root: anything reached here escaped the sandbox
outsideDir = filepath.Join(tmpDir, "outside")
Expect(os.MkdirAll(outsideDir, 0755)).To(Succeed())
secretFile = filepath.Join(outsideDir, "secret.txt")
Expect(os.WriteFile(secretFile, []byte("secret"), 0600)).To(Succeed())
mountPoint = toPluginMountPoint(1)
manager = startSandboxManager(tmpDir, libraryDir, func(p *model.Plugin) {
p.AllLibraries = true
p.AllowWriteAccess = true
})
})
It("allows writing inside the mount", func() {
out := call(sandboxInput{Operation: "write_file", FilePath: "inside.txt", Content: "hello"})
Expect(out.Error).To(BeNil())
Expect(os.ReadFile(filepath.Join(libraryDir, "inside.txt"))).To(BeEquivalentTo("hello"))
})
It("cannot escape the mount by creating a symlink", func() {
linked := call(sandboxInput{Operation: "symlink", FilePath: "escape", Target: "../outside"})
Expect(linked.Error).ToNot(BeNil())
_, err := os.Lstat(filepath.Join(libraryDir, "escape"))
Expect(err).To(MatchError(os.ErrNotExist), "the plugin created a symlink out of the mount")
wrote := call(sandboxInput{Operation: "write_file", FilePath: "escape/via-created-symlink.txt", Content: "escaped"})
Expect(wrote.Error).ToNot(BeNil())
Expect(filepath.Join(outsideDir, "via-created-symlink.txt")).ToNot(BeAnExistingFile())
})
// Accepted residual, pinned so a future tightening can't happen silently
It("still follows a symlink planted in the mount by something else", func() {
test(plugins): build test plugins in Go instead of shelling out to make (#6060) * test(plugins): build test plugins in Go instead of shelling out to make The plugins suite built its .ndp test packages by running `make -C plugins/testdata`, which needs make and zip on the PATH. That is the reason the 26 WASM-dependent spec files are tagged //go:build !windows. buildTestPlugins now does the same work in Go: the same mtime check make performed, `GOOS=wasip1 GOARCH=wasm go build` per plugin, and archive/zip for the package. TinyGo was already optional and unused in CI, so nothing is lost there. The first plugin builds on its own so the shared wasip1 stdlib and PDK objects land in the build cache before the rest fan out: on a cold cache that is 2.2s against 3.4s for the sequential make and 7.3s for an unrestrained fan-out. Packaging moved into a writeNdp helper shared with createTestPackage, which was already writing the same two-entry archive. Entries are written in a fixed order, so the .ndp bytes are now reproducible; the loader hashes those bytes, and `zip` also stored file mtimes, so the previous packages differed on every rebuild. The Makefile is unchanged and still works for building the plugins by hand. Removing the !windows tags is a separate step, once CI is green here. * test(plugins): run the WASM plugin specs on Windows With the test plugins now built in Go, nothing in the suite needs a Unix toolchain, so the //go:build !windows tags come off all 25 spec files. The Windows CI job runs `go test ./...`, so it picks the suite up with no workflow change. plugins_suite_windows_test.go existed only to bootstrap the handful of specs that compiled on Windows; plugins_suite_test.go now serves both. * test(plugins): skip the planted-symlink spec where symlinks need privileges os.Symlink needs an elevated token or Developer Mode on Windows, so the unconditional Expect(...).To(Succeed()) would fail for contributors running the suite on an ordinary Windows box. The elevated GitHub runner hides this. The equivalent spec in sandbox_fs_internal_test.go already attempts the symlink and skips on error; this does the same, keeping the pin live everywhere it can run, including Windows CI. * fix(ci): stop the Windows ndpgen test failing silently The ndpgen suite builds its helper binary to %TEMP%\ndpgen-test, and Windows will not exec a file without an executable extension, so the "supports verbose mode" spec has been failing there. Nobody noticed because the Test ndpgen step ran under pwsh, which carries on after a non-zero exit and takes the step's status from the last command, so the job stayed green with a FAIL line in its log. Add the .exe suffix, and run the step under bash like the Linux job does, so a failure in any of its three commands fails the job.
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if err := os.Symlink(outsideDir, filepath.Join(libraryDir, "planted")); err != nil {
Skip("cannot create symlinks here: " + err.Error()) // Windows without privileges
}
fix(plugins): confine plugin filesystem mounts to their root (#5881) * fix(plugins): confine plugin filesystem mounts to their root A plugin granted read-write filesystem access could escape its mount by creating a relative symlink inside it and then writing through that link, reaching any path the server process can write, including navidrome.db. wazero resolves guest paths by concatenating them onto the host root. Its WASI layer validates every path argument except the symlink target, which path_symlink forwards unvalidated by design, and fs.ValidPath splits on "/" only, so on Windows a "..\" path escapes the mount as well. Mounts now go through a jailedFS wrapper that denies symlink creation and rejects any path that is not filepath.IsLocal. That requires bypassing extism's AllowedPaths, which discards any FSConfig passed alongside it, so the mounts are built directly and applied per instance instead. Following symlinks that already exist in a mount is unchanged: music libraries rely on it, and read-only mounts already reject creating new ones. * test(plugins): guard against setting extism AllowedPaths Extracts the extism manifest construction so a test can assert AllowedPaths is never set. Setting it makes extism build its own FSConfig and discard the jailed mounts, silently restoring the symlink escape. Verified by simulating the regression: with AllowedPaths populated for plugins holding the filesystem permission, the new spec fails, as do two of the end-to-end sandbox specs.
2026-08-02 12:27:08 -04:00
out := call(sandboxInput{Operation: "write_file", FilePath: "planted/via-symlink.txt", Content: "escaped"})
Expect(out.Error).To(BeNil())
Expect(filepath.Join(outsideDir, "via-symlink.txt")).To(BeAnExistingFile())
})
It("cannot read outside the mount with ..", func() {
out := call(sandboxInput{Operation: "read_file", FilePath: "../outside/secret.txt"})
Expect(out.Error).ToNot(BeNil())
Expect(out.FileContent).ToNot(Equal("secret"))
})
It("cannot write outside the mount with ..", func() {
out := call(sandboxInput{Operation: "write_file", FilePath: "../outside/via-dotdot.txt", Content: "escaped"})
Expect(out.Error).ToNot(BeNil())
Expect(filepath.Join(outsideDir, "via-dotdot.txt")).ToNot(BeAnExistingFile())
})
})
var _ = Describe("Plugin filesystem sandbox without library access", Ordered, func() {
var manager *Manager
var libraryDir string
BeforeAll(func() {
tmpDir := GinkgoT().TempDir()
libraryDir = filepath.Join(tmpDir, "music-library")
Expect(os.MkdirAll(libraryDir, 0755)).To(Succeed())
Expect(os.WriteFile(filepath.Join(libraryDir, "track.txt"), []byte("audio"), 0600)).To(Succeed())
manager = startSandboxManager(tmpDir, libraryDir, func(*model.Plugin) {})
})
It("mounts nothing when no library is granted", func() {
manager.mu.RLock()
p := manager.plugins["test-library"]
manager.mu.RUnlock()
Expect(p.fsConfig).To(BeNil())
out := callSandbox(manager, sandboxInput{Operation: "read_file", MountPoint: toPluginMountPoint(1), FilePath: "track.txt"})
Expect(out.Error).ToNot(BeNil())
})
})