navidrome/core/auth/auth_test.go

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package auth_test
import (
"testing"
"time"
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"github.com/navidrome/navidrome/conf"
"github.com/navidrome/navidrome/consts"
"github.com/navidrome/navidrome/core/auth"
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"github.com/navidrome/navidrome/log"
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"github.com/navidrome/navidrome/model"
"github.com/navidrome/navidrome/tests"
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. "github.com/onsi/ginkgo/v2"
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. "github.com/onsi/gomega"
)
func TestAuth(t *testing.T) {
log.SetLevel(log.LevelFatal)
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RegisterFailHandler(Fail)
RunSpecs(t, "Auth Test Suite")
}
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const (
oneDay = 24 * time.Hour
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)
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var _ = BeforeSuite(func() {
conf.Server.SessionTimeout = 2 * oneDay
})
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var _ = Describe("Auth", func() {
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BeforeEach(func() {
ds := &tests.MockDataStore{
MockedProperty: &tests.MockedPropertyRepo{},
}
auth.Init(ds)
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})
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Describe("Validate", func() {
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It("returns error with an invalid JWT token", func() {
_, err := auth.Validate("invalid.token")
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Expect(err).To(HaveOccurred())
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})
It("returns the claims from a valid JWT token", func() {
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claims := map[string]any{}
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claims["iss"] = "issuer"
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claims["iat"] = time.Now().Unix()
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claims["exp"] = time.Now().Add(1 * time.Minute).Unix()
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_, tokenStr, err := auth.TokenAuth.Encode(claims)
Expect(err).NotTo(HaveOccurred())
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decodedClaims, err := auth.Validate(tokenStr)
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Expect(err).NotTo(HaveOccurred())
Expect(decodedClaims.Issuer).To(Equal("issuer"))
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})
It("returns ErrExpired if the `exp` field is in the past", func() {
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claims := map[string]any{}
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claims["iss"] = "issuer"
claims["exp"] = time.Now().Add(-1 * time.Minute).Unix()
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_, tokenStr, err := auth.TokenAuth.Encode(claims)
Expect(err).NotTo(HaveOccurred())
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_, err = auth.Validate(tokenStr)
Expect(err).To(MatchError("token is expired"))
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})
})
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Describe("CreateToken", func() {
It("creates a valid token", func() {
u := &model.User{
ID: "123",
UserName: "johndoe",
IsAdmin: true,
}
tokenStr, err := auth.CreateToken(u)
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Expect(err).NotTo(HaveOccurred())
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claims, err := auth.Validate(tokenStr)
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Expect(err).NotTo(HaveOccurred())
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Expect(claims.Issuer).To(Equal(consts.JWTIssuer))
Expect(claims.Subject).To(Equal("johndoe"))
Expect(claims.UserID).To(Equal("123"))
Expect(claims.IsAdmin).To(Equal(true))
Expect(claims.ExpiresAt).To(BeTemporally(">", time.Now()))
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})
})
refactor(db): migrate all ids to a uniform canonical 128-bit base62 encoding (#5824) * refactor(model): extract canonical 128-bit base62 id codec * feat(model): generate random ids as canonical 128-bit base62 values * feat(scanner): emit legacy PIDs in canonical base62 encoding * feat(db): add id canonicalization transform for the uniform-ids migration * feat(db): migrate all ids to canonical 128-bit base62 encoding * fix(db): canonicalize ids in junction tables and JSON columns * chore(jellyfin): update id-family notes for uniform canonical ids * test(ids): harden codec input contract and migration edge coverage * refactor(model): use log.Fatal for Encode128 contract guard per project convention * fix(db): force full rescan after id migration for legacy PID configs * test(db): guard id-column inventory against schema drift * refactor(ids): compile-time Encode128 contract and unified column rewrite helper * refactor(db): apply review feedback to id migration Filter empty strings in collectColumn's SQL, reuse a prepared statement for rewriteColumn updates, and clarify the legacy ID functions' comment now that they emit the canonical encoding. * feat(auth): split session and public-link JWT secrets, rotating sessions on id migration * test(subsonic): initialize public token secret in helpers suite The suite sets auth.TokenAuth directly instead of calling auth.Init, so the new PublicTokenAuth was nil whenever Ginkgo's spec order ran a helpers spec before any spec that calls auth.Init, panicking in publicurl.ImageURL. * refactor(db): inline canonicalID into its only consumer, the uniform-ids migration * refactor(model): rename Encode128/Decode128 to Encode/Decode With every id now exactly 128 bits, the width suffix is redundant; the package-qualified id.Encode/id.Decode carries the same information. * test(db): make the id-columns guard classify JSON columns too The guard only inspected columns named id/pid/*_id, so it could not see ids embedded in JSON. Widen it to *_ids and to every JSON column, and drive the "covered" set from a new embeddedIDColumns list instead of the inline calls in the migration. Every JSON column the schema has now carries a verdict. The four denormalized caches -- media_file/album.participants, media_file/album.tags, album.folder_ids and artist.similar_artists -- hold only artist, tag and folder ids. Those all come from id.NewHash, whose 22-char base62 encoding of a 128-bit MD5 is already in canonical range, so canonicalID is the identity on them and the migration correctly leaves them alone. A new codec test pins that invariant, since the exemptions depend on it. Verified on a copy of a 727MB/96k-track production database: canonicalizing those four columns changed zero rows, and artist, tag and folder ids were themselves unchanged by the migration (only media_file ids moved, 95108 of 96666).
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Describe("Session/Public secret split", func() {
claims := func() map[string]any {
return map[string]any{"iss": "issuer", "exp": time.Now().Add(1 * time.Minute).Unix()}
}
It("verifies a session token via Validate but not ValidatePublic", func() {
_, tokenStr, err := auth.TokenAuth.Encode(claims())
Expect(err).NotTo(HaveOccurred())
_, err = auth.Validate(tokenStr)
Expect(err).NotTo(HaveOccurred())
_, err = auth.ValidatePublic(tokenStr)
Expect(err).To(HaveOccurred())
})
It("verifies a public token via ValidatePublic but not Validate", func() {
_, tokenStr, err := auth.PublicTokenAuth.Encode(claims())
Expect(err).NotTo(HaveOccurred())
_, err = auth.ValidatePublic(tokenStr)
Expect(err).NotTo(HaveOccurred())
_, err = auth.Validate(tokenStr)
Expect(err).To(HaveOccurred())
})
It("decodes public tokens minted by CreatePublicToken via PublicTokenAuth", func() {
tokenStr, err := auth.CreatePublicToken(auth.Claims{ID: "art-1"})
Expect(err).NotTo(HaveOccurred())
claims, err := auth.ValidatePublic(tokenStr)
Expect(err).NotTo(HaveOccurred())
Expect(claims.ID).To(Equal("art-1"))
_, err = auth.Validate(tokenStr)
Expect(err).To(HaveOccurred())
})
It("decodes expiring public tokens minted by CreateExpiringPublicToken via PublicTokenAuth", func() {
exp := time.Now().Add(1 * time.Hour)
tokenStr, err := auth.CreateExpiringPublicToken(exp, auth.Claims{ID: "art-2"})
Expect(err).NotTo(HaveOccurred())
claims, err := auth.ValidatePublic(tokenStr)
Expect(err).NotTo(HaveOccurred())
Expect(claims.ID).To(Equal("art-2"))
_, err = auth.Validate(tokenStr)
Expect(err).To(HaveOccurred())
})
})
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Describe("TouchToken", func() {
It("updates the expiration time", func() {
yesterday := time.Now().Add(-oneDay)
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claims := map[string]any{}
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claims["iss"] = "issuer"
claims["exp"] = yesterday.Unix()
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token, _, err := auth.TokenAuth.Encode(claims)
Expect(err).NotTo(HaveOccurred())
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touched, err := auth.TouchToken(token)
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Expect(err).NotTo(HaveOccurred())
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decodedClaims, err := auth.Validate(touched)
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Expect(err).NotTo(HaveOccurred())
Expect(decodedClaims.ExpiresAt.Sub(yesterday)).To(BeNumerically(">=", oneDay))
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})
})
feat(jellyfin): non-expiring, audience-scoped tokens revocable by password change (#6013) * feat(auth): add per-user token_epoch column and bump method * feat(auth): add aud and ep claims, omitted when zero * feat(auth): add CreateAPIToken for non-expiring, audience-scoped tokens * feat(auth): add CheckClaims for epoch and audience validation * feat(jellyfin): issue non-expiring, jellyfin-scoped access tokens * fix(subsonic): reject API-scoped and revoked tokens on the jwt path * fix(server): reject API-scoped and revoked tokens on the native API * fix(server): pin the token-subject guard and stop leaking test config Adds a regression spec for the DevAutoLogin/ExtAuth guard in tokenAllowed, switches its comparison to case-insensitive to match the user lookup's own COLLATE NOCASE semantics, and restores Subsonic JWT test config after each spec instead of leaking SessionTimeout. * feat(request): add a token epoch holder for handler-to-middleware signalling * refactor(server): write the refreshed JWT header after the handler runs * feat(auth): revoke all tokens for a user when their password changes * fix(server): restore Unwrap on the JWT refresh writer so SSE write deadlines apply * test(auth): pin that non-session tokens reject API access tokens * test(jellyfin): pin token scoping and epoch revocation end to end Exercises auth.CreateAPIToken and CheckClaims against the real Jellyfin router and SQLite DB: the minted token has no exp and is aud-scoped to jellyfin, and bumping token_epoch through the real UserRepository revokes an already-issued token on the next protected request. * test(nativeapi): pin the token-epoch handoff through a real password-change request Drive a self password change through the real Authenticator/JWTRefresher chain and a real SQLite-backed userRepository, so the epoch handoff between Put and the refreshed-token writer is verified end to end, not as two separately-tested halves. Also fix tokenAllowed to read the enriched ctx it was given instead of r.Context(), so its warning log carries the username. * refactor(server): drop tokenAllowed's now-unused request parameter Finding-2 already moved every use to ctx; r was dead weight. Also note in the new nativeapi test why it must stay the package's only real-DB spec: db.Db() is a process-wide singleton its cleanup closes for good. * refactor(auth): remove duplication in claim decoding and token minting * refactor(auth): group aud with the standard JWT claims * refactor(auth): read aud with the standard-claim accessor pattern * fix(log): redact every api_key spelling the Jellyfin API accepts * fix(auth): bind session tokens to the user id, not just the username * fix(auth): return the token epoch from the same atomic increment * fix(auth): bump the token epoch in the same statement as the password write * chore(auth): trim comments to the why-only budget
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Describe("CreateAPIToken", func() {
var usr *model.User
BeforeEach(func() {
usr = &model.User{ID: "123", UserName: "johndoe", TokenEpoch: 4}
})
It("does not expire", func() {
tokenStr, err := auth.CreateAPIToken(usr, auth.AudienceJellyfin)
Expect(err).ToNot(HaveOccurred())
claims, err := auth.Validate(tokenStr)
Expect(err).ToNot(HaveOccurred())
Expect(claims.ExpiresAt.IsZero()).To(BeTrue())
})
It("carries the audience and the user's epoch", func() {
tokenStr, err := auth.CreateAPIToken(usr, auth.AudienceJellyfin)
Expect(err).ToNot(HaveOccurred())
claims, err := auth.Validate(tokenStr)
Expect(err).ToNot(HaveOccurred())
Expect(claims.Audience).To(Equal([]string{"jellyfin"}))
Expect(claims.Epoch).To(Equal(4))
Expect(claims.Subject).To(Equal("johndoe"))
Expect(claims.UserID).To(Equal("123"))
})
})
Describe("CreateToken with an epoch", func() {
It("carries the epoch and still expires", func() {
usr := &model.User{ID: "123", UserName: "johndoe", TokenEpoch: 9}
tokenStr, err := auth.CreateToken(usr)
Expect(err).ToNot(HaveOccurred())
claims, err := auth.Validate(tokenStr)
Expect(err).ToNot(HaveOccurred())
Expect(claims.Epoch).To(Equal(9))
Expect(claims.Audience).To(BeEmpty())
Expect(claims.ExpiresAt).To(BeTemporally(">", time.Now()))
})
})
Describe("TouchClaims", func() {
It("preserves custom claims and refreshes the expiry", func() {
tokenStr, err := auth.TouchClaims(auth.Claims{Subject: "johndoe", UserID: "123", Epoch: 5})
Expect(err).ToNot(HaveOccurred())
claims, err := auth.Validate(tokenStr)
Expect(err).ToNot(HaveOccurred())
Expect(claims.Epoch).To(Equal(5))
Expect(claims.Subject).To(Equal("johndoe"))
Expect(claims.ExpiresAt).To(BeTemporally(">", time.Now()))
})
})
Describe("CheckClaims", func() {
usr := model.User{ID: "123", UserName: "johndoe", TokenEpoch: 2}
It("accepts a matching epoch and audience", func() {
c := auth.Claims{Epoch: 2, Audience: []string{auth.AudienceJellyfin}}
Expect(auth.CheckClaims(c, usr, auth.AudienceJellyfin)).To(Succeed())
})
It("accepts a token with no audience on any API", func() {
c := auth.Claims{Epoch: 2}
Expect(auth.CheckClaims(c, usr, auth.AudienceNative)).To(Succeed())
Expect(auth.CheckClaims(c, usr, auth.AudienceJellyfin)).To(Succeed())
Expect(auth.CheckClaims(c, usr, auth.AudienceSubsonic)).To(Succeed())
})
It("rejects a stale epoch", func() {
c := auth.Claims{Epoch: 1, Audience: []string{auth.AudienceJellyfin}}
Expect(auth.CheckClaims(c, usr, auth.AudienceJellyfin)).To(MatchError(auth.ErrTokenRevoked))
})
It("rejects a token minted for another API", func() {
c := auth.Claims{Epoch: 2, Audience: []string{auth.AudienceJellyfin}}
Expect(auth.CheckClaims(c, usr, auth.AudienceNative)).To(MatchError(auth.ErrWrongAudience))
Expect(auth.CheckClaims(c, usr, auth.AudienceSubsonic)).To(MatchError(auth.ErrWrongAudience))
})
It("accepts a multi-audience token that includes this API", func() {
c := auth.Claims{Epoch: 2, Audience: []string{"other", auth.AudienceNative}}
Expect(auth.CheckClaims(c, usr, auth.AudienceNative)).To(Succeed())
})
It("accepts a pre-upgrade token against a never-bumped user", func() {
fresh := model.User{ID: "456", UserName: "newbie"}
Expect(auth.CheckClaims(auth.Claims{}, fresh, auth.AudienceNative)).To(Succeed())
})
It("accepts a token whose user id matches", func() {
c := auth.Claims{UserID: "123", Epoch: 2}
Expect(auth.CheckClaims(c, usr, auth.AudienceNative)).To(Succeed())
})
It("rejects a token for a deleted user recreated under the same name", func() {
recreated := model.User{ID: "new-random-id", UserName: "johndoe"}
c := auth.Claims{UserID: "123", Audience: []string{auth.AudienceJellyfin}}
Expect(auth.CheckClaims(c, recreated, auth.AudienceJellyfin)).To(MatchError(auth.ErrWrongUser))
})
It("accepts a token that carries no user id", func() {
fresh := model.User{ID: "456", UserName: "newbie"}
Expect(auth.CheckClaims(auth.Claims{}, fresh, auth.AudienceNative)).To(Succeed())
})
})
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})