API v1 no longer mints short-lived JWT access tokens. Clients send the grant
secret from POST /auth/login or /auth/setup as `Authorization: Bearer` on
every request.
Every request already looked the grant up in the database, so the JWT gave
no speed or revocation benefit and only added a refresh loop, which early
client authors pushed back on. The grant already is an API key: one per
client sign-in, scoped and revocable. Revocation is now immediate on every
node; the contract promises "within one minute".
Removed: POST /auth/token, the grantAuth scheme, the TokenRequest and
AccessToken schemas, the token_expired problem code, the API v1 JWT signer
and its signing key, the grant liveness cache, and PropertyRepository.PutIfAbsent.
ResolveGrant is now Authenticate.
Short-lived tokens return later only as narrow media tokens for
?access_token= on media URLs, together with the media endpoints.
Signed-off-by: Deluan <deluan@navidrome.org>
Rate-limit counts are per node, so X-RateLimit-Remaining would mislead
clients once API v1 runs behind more than one instance. API v1 now sends
only Retry-After on 429; v0 and Jellyfin limiters keep their headers.
- GrantRepository keeps three deletes: DeleteForUser, DeleteStaleEpochs
(replaces DeleteOtherEpochs and DeleteIfEpoch) and DeleteIdle. Delete(id)
is gone; the idle path in ResolveGrant now calls DeleteIdle, so a grant
renewed by another node between the read and the delete survives.
settleEpoch deletes the user's grants below the snapshot's epoch, which
is safe outside the transaction because epochs only move forward.
- The "dead grants on an older epoch are only deleted when presented"
policy note moves from the repository to core ListGrants.
- SQL trace logging no longer prints the args of property writes (signing
keys) or user password writes, both encrypted with a key that may be the
public default. The SQL statement is still logged.
- The spec gate rejects JSON body keys that differ from a declared property
only in case. kin-openapi validates exact names while encoding/json
decodes case-insensitively, so {"scopes":[],"Scopes":null} minted a
token with every scope and a "Client" key skipped maxLength.
It also rejects data after the first JSON value, which the handlers'
decoder ignores and which let a body skip the alias check.
- The liveness cache trims its eviction log on evict, not only on put, so
evict-only traffic stays bounded; the floor still drops stale fills.
- createAccessToken, login and setupFirstAdmin declare Cache-Control:
no-store on their success responses.
Key operations by a struct, share the validation options, derive the
route method from chi, and set every rule-derived field in buildGateOp.
Build WWW-Authenticate challenges and 413 problems in one place, fetch
the principal through one helper, and refuse gate rules that name an
operation missing from the spec.
The gate passed server.ClientIP to Authenticate and ResolveGrant, which
masks IPv6 addresses to their /64 for rate limiting, so lastUsedIp stored
a prefix. A new server.ClientAddr returns the resolved address unmasked;
ClientIP builds on it and stays the rate limiter key.
A 401 raised after a token was accepted by the gate, such as a password
change whose grant was revoked mid-request, carried a bare Bearer
challenge. writeProblemStatus now answers Bearer error="invalid_token"
whenever the request presented a bearer token.
login, setupFirstAdmin and createAccessToken responses now carry
Cache-Control: no-store (RFC 6749 section 5.1), set by the gate for a
small list of operations so their error responses are covered too.
The v0/v1 setup race test also checks the v1 status is 201 or 409.