navidrome/server/middlewares.go
Deluan Quintão c3b9b4ecb3
fix(subsonic): rate limit failed authentication attempts (#6185)
* fix(subsonic): limit failed authentication attempts per client IP and username

The Subsonic API checked credentials on every request with no limit on failures, so any
account could be brute-forced over /rest/*. Failed u+p, t+s and jwt attempts are now capped
per (client IP, lower-cased username) using AuthRequestLimit and AuthWindowLength, the same
settings that guard the UI login. Every request carries credentials, so only failures count:
a slot is taken before the check and given back on success or on a server error, which also
stops concurrent guesses from overshooting the limit.

Blocked attempts get the same response as a wrong password (HTTP 200, error code 40, no
Retry-After), so an attacker cannot tell a block from a wrong guess. Reverse proxy and
internal authentication are not limited. The client IP helper behind ClientIPRateLimiter is
now exported as server.ClientIP, so spoofed forwarding headers cannot open a fresh bucket.

* refactor(subsonic): simplify failed authentication limiter

Release the limiter slot from a single place in authenticate(), after the user lookup and
credential check, instead of separately in the canceled branch. Store attempt counters by
value instead of by pointer, and drop limiter unit tests that only repeated the middleware
specs.

* fix(subsonic): wait for an in-flight auth check instead of rejecting

Slots were reserved before the credential check and only released afterwards, so once
AuthRequestLimit checks for the same client IP and username overlapped, the next request was
answered with error code 40 even when its credentials were valid. Clients that fan out parallel
requests hit this constantly: a burst of six valid logins lost one, a burst of fifty lost forty
five, and the web UI authenticates its own /rest calls the same way.

A key now carries a slot channel of AuthRequestLimit capacity, and a request waits on it rather
than failing when other checks for that key are in flight. Failures are recorded after the check,
and a request is only rejected when the key already reached the limit within the window. A waiting
request gives up if its context is canceled. Concurrent guesses still cannot run unchecked: at most
AuthRequestLimit checks run at once and the rest are turned away as soon as the failures land.

* docs(subsonic): state the real guess ceiling of the auth limiter

The comment claimed a burst cannot overshoot, which reads as a hard cap of AuthRequestLimit. Allowing concurrent checks means a window admits up to 2*limit-1 guesses, so say that instead.
2026-09-20 22:02:23 -04:00

396 lines
13 KiB
Go

package server
import (
"cmp"
"context"
"encoding/json"
"errors"
"fmt"
"io/fs"
"net"
"net/http"
"net/netip"
"net/url"
"strings"
"time"
"github.com/go-chi/chi/v5"
"github.com/go-chi/chi/v5/middleware"
"github.com/go-chi/cors"
"github.com/go-chi/httprate"
"github.com/navidrome/navidrome/conf"
"github.com/navidrome/navidrome/consts"
"github.com/navidrome/navidrome/log"
"github.com/navidrome/navidrome/model"
"github.com/navidrome/navidrome/model/request"
"github.com/navidrome/navidrome/utils"
"github.com/unrolled/secure"
)
func requestLogger(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
scheme := "http"
if r.TLS != nil {
scheme = "https"
}
start := time.Now()
ww := middleware.NewWrapResponseWriter(w, r.ProtoMajor)
next.ServeHTTP(ww, r)
status := ww.Status()
message := fmt.Sprintf("HTTP: %s %s://%s%s", r.Method, scheme, r.Host, r.RequestURI)
logArgs := []any{
r.Context(),
message,
"remoteAddr", r.RemoteAddr,
"elapsedTime", time.Since(start),
"httpStatus", ww.Status(),
"responseSize", ww.BytesWritten(),
}
if log.IsGreaterOrEqualTo(log.LevelTrace) {
headers, _ := json.Marshal(r.Header)
logArgs = append(logArgs, "header", string(headers))
} else if log.IsGreaterOrEqualTo(log.LevelDebug) {
logArgs = append(logArgs, "userAgent", r.UserAgent())
}
switch {
case status >= 500:
log.Error(logArgs...)
case status >= 400:
log.Warn(logArgs...)
default:
log.Debug(logArgs...)
}
})
}
func loggerInjector(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
ctx := r.Context()
ctx = log.NewContext(r.Context(), "requestId", middleware.GetReqID(ctx))
next.ServeHTTP(w, r.WithContext(ctx))
})
}
func robotsTXT(fs fs.FS) func(http.Handler) http.Handler {
return func(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
if strings.HasSuffix(r.URL.Path, "/robots.txt") {
r.URL.Path = "/robots.txt"
http.FileServerFS(fs).ServeHTTP(w, r)
} else {
next.ServeHTTP(w, r)
}
})
}
}
func corsHandler() func(http.Handler) http.Handler {
return cors.Handler(cors.Options{
AllowedOrigins: []string{"*"},
AllowedMethods: []string{
http.MethodHead,
http.MethodGet,
http.MethodPost,
http.MethodPut,
http.MethodPatch,
http.MethodDelete,
},
AllowedHeaders: []string{"*"},
AllowCredentials: false,
ExposedHeaders: []string{"x-content-duration", "x-total-count", "x-nd-authorization"},
})
}
func secureMiddleware() func(http.Handler) http.Handler {
sec := secure.New(secure.Options{
ContentTypeNosniff: true,
FrameDeny: true,
ReferrerPolicy: "same-origin",
PermissionsPolicy: "autoplay=(), camera=(), microphone=(), usb=()",
CustomFrameOptionsValue: conf.Server.HTTPHeaders.FrameOptions,
//ContentSecurityPolicy: "script-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'",
})
return sec.Handler
}
func compressMiddleware() func(http.Handler) http.Handler {
return middleware.Compress(
5,
"application/xml",
"application/json",
"application/javascript",
"text/html",
"text/plain",
"text/css",
"text/javascript",
"text/event-stream",
)
}
// clientUniqueIDMiddleware is a middleware that sets a unique client ID as a cookie if it's provided in the request header.
// If the unique client ID is not in the header but present as a cookie, it adds the ID to the request context.
func clientUniqueIDMiddleware(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
ctx := r.Context()
clientUniqueId := r.Header.Get(consts.UIClientUniqueIDHeader)
// If clientUniqueId is found in the header, set it as a cookie
if clientUniqueId != "" {
c := &http.Cookie{
Name: consts.UIClientUniqueIDHeader,
Value: clientUniqueId,
MaxAge: consts.CookieExpiry,
HttpOnly: true,
Secure: true,
SameSite: http.SameSiteStrictMode,
Path: cmp.Or(conf.Server.BasePath, "/"),
}
http.SetCookie(w, c)
} else {
// If clientUniqueId is not found in the header, check if it's present as a cookie
c, err := r.Cookie(consts.UIClientUniqueIDHeader)
if !errors.Is(err, http.ErrNoCookie) {
clientUniqueId = c.Value
}
}
// If a valid clientUniqueId is found, add it to the request context
if clientUniqueId != "" {
ctx = request.WithClientUniqueId(ctx, clientUniqueId)
r = r.WithContext(ctx)
}
// Call the next middleware or handler in the chain
next.ServeHTTP(w, r)
})
}
// realIPMiddleware resolves the request's client IP into the context, where it can be read with
// middleware.GetClientIP, and mirrors it into RemoteAddr for logging and player registration.
// Forwarding headers are only honoured when the peer is listed in ExtAuth.TrustedSources, so that
// a client cannot pick its own identity and evade controls keyed on it. The peer address is kept
// in the context as request.ReverseProxyIp.
func realIPMiddleware(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
trusted := conf.Server.ExtAuth.TrustedSources
fromPeer := middleware.ClientIPFromRemoteAddr(next)
if trusted == "" {
return fromPeer
}
// Last match wins, so this order reproduces RealIP's precedence: True-Client-IP, X-Real-IP,
// X-Forwarded-For, peer. Only X-Forwarded-For is checked against the trusted list.
fromProxy := chi.Chain(
middleware.ClientIPFromRemoteAddr,
middleware.ClientIPFromXFF(trustedProxyPrefixes(trusted)...),
middleware.ClientIPFromHeader("X-Real-IP"),
middleware.ClientIPFromHeader("True-Client-IP"),
).Handler(mirrorClientIP(next))
dispatch := http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
if validateIPAgainstList(r.RemoteAddr, trusted) {
fromProxy.ServeHTTP(w, r)
return
}
log.Trace(r.Context(), "Ignoring forwarding headers from untrusted peer", "peer", r.RemoteAddr)
fromPeer.ServeHTTP(w, r)
})
return reqToCtx(request.ReverseProxyIp, func(r *http.Request) any { return r.RemoteAddr })(dispatch)
}
// mirrorClientIP copies the resolved client IP into RemoteAddr when it differs from the peer.
func mirrorClientIP(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
if ip := middleware.GetClientIP(r.Context()); ip != "" && ip != peerHost(r) {
r.RemoteAddr = ip
}
next.ServeHTTP(w, r)
})
}
// peerHost returns the host part of RemoteAddr, which may already be a bare IP.
func peerHost(r *http.Request) string {
if host, _, err := net.SplitHostPort(r.RemoteAddr); err == nil {
return host
}
return r.RemoteAddr
}
// trustedProxyPrefixes returns the CIDR entries of a trusted sources list, skipping non-CIDR
// entries such as the "@" unix socket marker. An empty result makes ClientIPFromXFF trust
// exactly one hop.
func trustedProxyPrefixes(list string) []string {
var prefixes []string
for _, entry := range strings.Split(list, ",") {
entry = strings.TrimSpace(entry)
if _, err := netip.ParsePrefix(entry); err == nil {
prefixes = append(prefixes, entry)
}
}
return prefixes
}
// ClientIPRateLimiter returns a rate limiter keyed by ClientIP, so spoofed forwarding headers
// cannot be rotated for a fresh bucket.
func ClientIPRateLimiter(requestLimit int, windowLength time.Duration) func(http.Handler) http.Handler {
return httprate.LimitBy(requestLimit, windowLength, func(r *http.Request) (string, error) {
return ClientIP(r), nil
})
}
// ClientIP returns the canonical client IP resolved by realIPMiddleware, for keying rate limits. The
// peer address fallback degrades a missing middleware to per-peer limiting, not one shared bucket.
func ClientIP(r *http.Request) string {
return httprate.CanonicalizeIP(cmp.Or(middleware.GetClientIP(r.Context()), peerHost(r)))
}
// reqToCtx creates a middleware that updates the request's context with a value computed from the request. A given key
// can only be set once.
func reqToCtx(key any, fn func(req *http.Request) any) func(http.Handler) http.Handler {
return func(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
if r.Context().Value(key) == nil {
ctx := context.WithValue(r.Context(), key, fn(r))
r = r.WithContext(ctx)
}
next.ServeHTTP(w, r)
})
}
}
// serverAddressMiddleware is a middleware function that modifies the request object
// to reflect the address of the server handling the request, as determined by the
// presence of X-Forwarded-* headers or the scheme and host of the request URL.
func serverAddressMiddleware(h http.Handler) http.Handler {
// Define a new handler function that will be returned by this middleware function.
fn := func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
// Call the ServerAddress function to get the scheme and host of the server
// handling the request. If a host is found, modify the request object to use
// that host and scheme instead of the original ones.
if rScheme, rHost := ServerAddress(r); rHost != "" {
r.Host = rHost
r.URL.Scheme = rScheme
// Recorded so code running without the request (e.g. plugins) can build public URLs.
r = r.WithContext(request.WithServerAddress(r.Context(), rScheme, rHost))
}
// Call the next handler in the chain with the modified request and response.
h.ServeHTTP(w, r)
}
// Return the new handler function as a http.Handler object.
return http.HandlerFunc(fn)
}
// Define constants for the X-Forwarded-* header keys.
var (
xForwardedHost = http.CanonicalHeaderKey("X-Forwarded-Host")
xForwardedProto = http.CanonicalHeaderKey("X-Forwarded-Proto")
xForwardedScheme = http.CanonicalHeaderKey("X-Forwarded-Scheme")
)
// ServerAddress is a helper function that returns the scheme and host of the server
// handling the given request, as determined by the presence of X-Forwarded-* headers
// or the scheme and host of the request URL.
func ServerAddress(r *http.Request) (scheme, host string) {
// Save the original request host for later comparison.
origHost := r.Host
// Determine the protocol of the request based on the presence of a TLS connection.
protocol := "http"
if r.TLS != nil {
protocol = "https"
}
// Get the X-Forwarded-Host header and extract the first host name if there are
// multiple hosts listed. If there is no X-Forwarded-Host header, use the original
// request host as the default.
xfh := r.Header.Get(xForwardedHost)
if xfh != "" {
i := strings.Index(xfh, ",")
if i == -1 {
i = len(xfh)
}
xfh = xfh[:i]
}
host = cmp.Or(xfh, r.Host)
// Determine the protocol and scheme of the request based on the presence of
// X-Forwarded-* headers or the scheme of the request URL.
scheme = cmp.Or(
r.Header.Get(xForwardedProto),
r.Header.Get(xForwardedScheme),
r.URL.Scheme,
protocol,
)
// If the request host has changed due to the X-Forwarded-Host header, log a trace
// message with the original and new host values, as well as the scheme and URL.
if host != origHost {
log.Trace(r.Context(), "Request host has changed", "origHost", origHost, "host", host, "scheme", scheme, "url", r.URL)
}
// Return the scheme and host of the server handling the request.
return scheme, host
}
// URLParamsMiddleware is a middleware function that decodes the query string of
// the incoming HTTP request, adds the URL parameters from the routing context,
// and re-encodes the modified query string.
func URLParamsMiddleware(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
// Retrieve the routing context from the request context.
ctx := chi.RouteContext(r.Context())
// Parse the existing query string into a URL values map.
params, _ := url.ParseQuery(r.URL.RawQuery)
// Loop through each URL parameter in the routing context.
for i, key := range ctx.URLParams.Keys {
// Skip any wildcard URL parameter keys.
if strings.Contains(key, "*") {
continue
}
// Add the URL parameter key-value pair to the URL values map.
params.Add(":"+key, ctx.URLParams.Values[i])
}
// Re-encode the URL values map as a query string and replace the
// existing query string in the request.
r.URL.RawQuery = params.Encode()
// Call the next handler in the chain with the modified request and response.
next.ServeHTTP(w, r)
})
}
func UpdateLastAccessMiddleware(ds model.DataStore) func(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
userAccessLimiter := utils.Limiter{Interval: consts.UpdateLastAccessFrequency}
return func(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
ctx := r.Context()
usr, ok := request.UserFrom(ctx)
if ok {
userAccessLimiter.Do(usr.ID, func() {
start := time.Now()
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(ctx, time.Second)
defer cancel()
err := ds.User(ctx).UpdateLastAccessAt(usr.ID)
if err != nil {
log.Warn(ctx, "Could not update user's lastAccessAt", "username", usr.UserName,
"elapsed", time.Since(start), err)
} else {
log.Trace(ctx, "Update user's lastAccessAt", "username", usr.UserName,
"elapsed", time.Since(start))
}
})
}
next.ServeHTTP(w, r)
})
}
}