navidrome/plugins/host_httpclient.go
Deluan Quintão 1a8463f7de
Merge commit from fork
* fix(share): always assign the authenticated user as share owner

A share's UserID was taken from the request body and only defaulted when
empty, so any authenticated user could create a share attributed to
another user. For playlist shares the contents are resolved in the
owner's library-access context, turning the spoofed owner into an
access-escalation vector in multi-library setups.

Force the owner from the request context at both the service boundary
and the persistence layer, ignoring any client-supplied UserID.

* fix(plugins): block SSRF to private IPs resolved from hostnames

The HTTP host client only checked the literal host string, so a symbolic
hostname (or a trailing-dot "localhost.") resolving to a private/loopback
address bypassed the SSRF guard when a plugin declared no requiredHosts.

Enforce the check at dial time via net.Dialer.Control on the resolved IP,
which also covers redirect hops and DNS rebinding. When an explicit
requiredHosts allowlist is set, defer to it as the operator's trust decision.

* fix(plugins): gate private IPs on explicit IP/CIDR allowlist entries

Following review feedback: an allowlisted hostname authorizes the external
service, not whatever private IP it may resolve or rebind to. Enforce the
resolved-IP guard even when requiredHosts is set, permitting a private
address only when a literal IP or CIDR entry explicitly covers it. This
keeps "reach this external API" and "reach my internal network" as two
separate, explicit operator decisions.

* fix(plugins): treat unspecified addresses as private in the SSRF guard

Dialing 0.0.0.0 or :: reaches the local host, so they bypassed the
private/loopback check.

* fix(plugins): let a bare "*" allowlist reach private addresses

Plugins such as AudioMuse-AI declare requiredHosts ["*"] to reach a
user-configured service on the LAN, whose address the manifest cannot
know. Requiring a literal IP/CIDR entry broke them. Named hosts and
subdomain wildcards still cannot resolve to private addresses.

* refactor(plugins): simplify the SSRF-guarded HTTP client and release its pool

Build the client directly around the guarded transport instead of
replacing a throwaway one, fail closed on an unparseable dial address,
and close the per-plugin transport's idle connections when the plugin
unloads. Trim stale comments.

* fix(plugins): stop enabling extism's unguarded http_request host function

Passing requiredHosts as the extism manifest's AllowedHosts enabled
extism's own http_request (pdk.NewHTTPRequest), which only glob-matches
the hostname and follows redirects without re-checking, bypassing the
resolved-IP SSRF guard. Plugins must use host.HTTPSend.

* fix(plugins): move bundled Rust examples to the host HTTP service

Extism's built-in http_request is now disabled, so the webhook and
Discord examples switch to nd_pdk::host::http::send. Update the README
to say host.HTTPSend is the only supported way to make HTTP requests.

* fix(plugins): move the Python example to the host HTTP service

coverartarchive-py used extism's built-in Http.request, which is now
disabled. Call Navidrome's http_send host function instead. The plugin
can no longer run under the standalone extism CLI, so drop the CLI test
targets and instructions.
2026-09-12 13:38:08 -04:00

256 lines
7.7 KiB
Go

package plugins
import (
"bytes"
"cmp"
"context"
"fmt"
"io"
"net"
"net/http"
"net/url"
"slices"
"strings"
"syscall"
"time"
"github.com/navidrome/navidrome/log"
"github.com/navidrome/navidrome/plugins/host"
"github.com/navidrome/navidrome/utils/httpclient"
)
const (
httpClientDefaultTimeout = 10 * time.Second
httpClientMaxRedirects = 5
httpClientMaxResponseBodyLen = 10 * 1024 * 1024 // 10 MB
)
// contextKey is used for per-request redirect control via context.
type contextKey struct{}
// noFollowRedirectsKey signals the CheckRedirect callback to stop following redirects.
var noFollowRedirectsKey = contextKey{}
// httpServiceImpl implements host.HTTPService.
type httpServiceImpl struct {
pluginName string
requiredHosts []string
client *http.Client
transport *http.Transport
}
// newHTTPService creates a new HTTPService for a plugin.
func newHTTPService(pluginName string, permission *HTTPPermission) *httpServiceImpl {
var requiredHosts []string
if permission != nil {
requiredHosts = permission.RequiredHosts
}
svc := &httpServiceImpl{
pluginName: pluginName,
requiredHosts: requiredHosts,
}
svc.transport = http.DefaultTransport.(*http.Transport).Clone()
svc.transport.DialContext = (&net.Dialer{
Timeout: 30 * time.Second,
KeepAlive: 30 * time.Second,
Control: svc.dialControl,
}).DialContext
// No client timeout: it is set per-request via context deadline.
svc.client = &http.Client{Transport: httpclient.NewTransport(svc.transport)}
svc.client.CheckRedirect = func(req *http.Request, via []*http.Request) error {
if req.Context().Value(noFollowRedirectsKey) != nil {
return http.ErrUseLastResponse
}
if len(via) >= httpClientMaxRedirects {
log.Warn(req.Context(), "HTTP redirect limit exceeded", "plugin", svc.pluginName, "url", req.URL.String(), "redirectCount", len(via))
return http.ErrUseLastResponse
}
if err := svc.validateHost(req.Context(), req.URL.Host); err != nil {
log.Warn(req.Context(), "HTTP redirect blocked", "plugin", svc.pluginName, "url", req.URL.String(), "err", err)
return err
}
return nil
}
return svc
}
// Close releases the plugin's pooled connections when the plugin is unloaded.
func (s *httpServiceImpl) Close() error {
s.transport.CloseIdleConnections()
return nil
}
func (s *httpServiceImpl) Send(ctx context.Context, request host.HTTPRequest) (*host.HTTPResponse, error) {
// Parse and validate URL
parsedURL, err := url.Parse(request.URL)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid URL: %w", err)
}
// Validate URL scheme
if parsedURL.Scheme != "http" && parsedURL.Scheme != "https" {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid URL scheme %q: must be http or https", parsedURL.Scheme)
}
// Validate host against allowed hosts and private IP restrictions
if err := s.validateHost(ctx, parsedURL.Host); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
// Apply per-request timeout via context deadline
timeout := cmp.Or(time.Duration(request.TimeoutMs)*time.Millisecond, httpClientDefaultTimeout)
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(ctx, timeout)
defer cancel()
// Signal CheckRedirect to not follow redirects for this request
if request.NoFollowRedirects {
ctx = context.WithValue(ctx, noFollowRedirectsKey, true)
}
// Build request body
method := strings.ToUpper(request.Method)
var body io.Reader
if len(request.Body) > 0 {
body = bytes.NewReader(request.Body)
}
// Create HTTP request
httpReq, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, method, request.URL, body)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("creating request: %w", err)
}
for k, v := range request.Headers {
httpReq.Header.Set(k, v)
}
// Execute request
resp, err := s.client.Do(httpReq) //nolint:gosec // URL is validated against requiredHosts
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
defer resp.Body.Close()
log.Trace(ctx, "HTTP request", "plugin", s.pluginName, "method", method, "url", request.URL, "status", resp.StatusCode)
// Read response body (with size limit to prevent memory exhaustion)
respBody, err := io.ReadAll(io.LimitReader(resp.Body, httpClientMaxResponseBodyLen))
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("reading response body: %w", err)
}
// Flatten response headers (first value only)
headers := make(map[string]string, len(resp.Header))
for k, v := range resp.Header {
if len(v) > 0 {
headers[k] = v[0]
}
}
return &host.HTTPResponse{
StatusCode: int32(resp.StatusCode),
Headers: headers,
Body: respBody,
}, nil
}
// validateHost checks whether a request to the given host is permitted.
// When requiredHosts is set, it checks against the allowlist.
// When requiredHosts is empty, it blocks private/loopback IPs to prevent SSRF.
func (s *httpServiceImpl) validateHost(ctx context.Context, hostStr string) error {
hostname := extractHostname(hostStr)
if len(s.requiredHosts) > 0 {
if !s.isHostAllowed(hostname) {
return fmt.Errorf("host %q is not allowed", hostStr)
}
return nil
}
// No explicit allowlist: block private/loopback IPs
if isPrivateOrLoopback(hostname) {
log.Warn(ctx, "HTTP request to private/loopback address blocked", "plugin", s.pluginName, "host", hostStr)
return fmt.Errorf("host %q is not allowed: private/loopback addresses require explicit requiredHosts in manifest", hostStr)
}
return nil
}
// dialControl checks the resolved IP, so hostnames can't reach private addresses unless a literal
// IP/CIDR entry or a bare "*" (plugins targeting user-configured LAN services) allows it.
func (s *httpServiceImpl) dialControl(_, address string, _ syscall.RawConn) error {
if slices.Contains(s.requiredHosts, "*") {
return nil
}
host, _, err := net.SplitHostPort(address)
if err != nil {
return err
}
ip := net.ParseIP(host)
if ip == nil || !isPrivateIP(ip) {
return nil
}
for _, entry := range s.requiredHosts {
if ipMatchesEntry(entry, ip) {
return nil
}
}
return fmt.Errorf("dial to private/loopback address %q blocked: requires an explicit IP or CIDR in requiredHosts", address)
}
// ipMatchesEntry reports whether a requiredHosts entry is a literal IP or CIDR
// that covers ip. Hostname and wildcard entries never match.
func ipMatchesEntry(entry string, ip net.IP) bool {
if _, cidr, err := net.ParseCIDR(entry); err == nil {
return cidr.Contains(ip)
}
if entryIP := net.ParseIP(entry); entryIP != nil {
return entryIP.Equal(ip)
}
return false
}
func (s *httpServiceImpl) isHostAllowed(hostname string) bool {
ip := net.ParseIP(hostname)
for _, pattern := range s.requiredHosts {
if matchHostPattern(pattern, hostname) {
return true
}
if ip != nil && ipMatchesEntry(pattern, ip) {
return true
}
}
return false
}
// extractHostname returns the hostname portion of a host string, stripping
// any port number and IPv6 brackets. It handles IPv6 addresses correctly
// (e.g. "[::1]:8080" → "::1", "[::1]" → "::1").
func extractHostname(hostStr string) string {
if h, _, err := net.SplitHostPort(hostStr); err == nil {
return h
}
// Strip IPv6 brackets when no port is present (e.g. "[::1]" → "::1")
if strings.HasPrefix(hostStr, "[") && strings.HasSuffix(hostStr, "]") {
return hostStr[1 : len(hostStr)-1]
}
return hostStr
}
// isPrivateOrLoopback is a pre-flight check on the literal host (IP or "localhost"); it does not
// resolve names, so dialControl remains the real guard.
func isPrivateOrLoopback(hostname string) bool {
if strings.EqualFold(hostname, "localhost") {
return true
}
ip := net.ParseIP(hostname)
if ip == nil {
return false
}
return isPrivateIP(ip)
}
func isPrivateIP(ip net.IP) bool {
return ip.IsLoopback() || ip.IsUnspecified() || ip.IsPrivate() || ip.IsLinkLocalUnicast() || ip.IsLinkLocalMulticast()
}
// Verify interface implementation
var _ host.HTTPService = (*httpServiceImpl)(nil)